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FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
ROBERT KRAMER
THE year 1958 was one of 'rather intense activity so far as the
'federal estate and gift taxes are concerned, and yet, when viewed
in long range perspective, doubts may arise about the actual signifi-
cance of many of these developments. The trilth may well be that
the federal estate, and gift taxes are not in the best of health, but
their ills are' apt to be increased rather than diminished by the
remedies'now applied, often, one suspects, With full knowledge on the
part of the doctors of the ultimate unfortunate effects of their
prescriptions upon the patient.
I
LEGISLATION'
Legislatively, the outstanding event was that Congress enacted
the Technical Amendments Act of 1958,1 which however many loop-
holes it may have closed in the income tax, is chiefly a relief measure
so far as the estate and gift taxes are involved. A rather ill-considered
section in the original House version' of the Act which half-hqrtedly
attempted to restore partially the premium payment test f~r taxation
of life insurance proceeds on decedent's life payable to beneficiaries
other than his estate, was eliminated from the final version of 'the Act.
Whatever the merits 'or defects of the premium payment test, the
provision in the original House bill had little to recommend it.8
Perhaps the most important provision4 of the Act concerns post-
ponement of payment of the estate tax on a small business which is
part of a decedent's estate. Under this new section 6166 of the Code,
the executor may elect (not later than the prescribed time for filing
the estate tax return or any extensions thereof5) to pay all or any
Robert Kramer is Professor of Law at Duke University School of Law, and a Mem-
ber of the District of Columbia and New York Bars.
1 72 Stat. 1606. This Article was written with an editorial deadline of November
is, 1958.
2 H.R. 8381, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 56 (1957).
8 See 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 114-15, in 1957 Ann. Survey Am. L. 162-63 (1958). For
highly critical comments upon the premium payment test, see Brown, How the Premium
Payment Test Affects Small Business, 36 Taxes 295 (1958) ; KnIckerbocker, Life
Insurance and Federal Taxes, 43 Cornell L.Q. 419 (1958).
4 Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, § 206(a), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6650, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See also 1958 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 43, at 4S-46.
r 15 months after decedent's death. Int. Rev. Code of 1954j § 6075(a). For
extensions, see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6081(a). If the due date of the return is
before September 3, 1958, the election applies only to a deficiency assessed after
September 2, 1958, and the election must be made no later than 60 days after Issuance
of notice and demand for payment of the deficiency.
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part of the tax (including a deficiency) attributable to the inclusion
of the value of decedent's interest in a closely held business in not
more than 10 nor less than 2 equal annual installments, the first being
due at the usual time prescribed for payment of the tax.' This provi-
sion applies only to estates of United States citizens or residents
dying after August 16, 1954. Interest at the rate of 4 per cent per
annum is payable annually upon the deferred unpaid amounts of
the tax.
A closely held business is defined as: (1) an interest as a proprie-
tor in a. trade'or business carried on as a proprietorship; (2) a part-
hership interest in a trade or business if the firm had no more than
10 partners or if 20 per cent or more of the total capital interest of
the firm is included in decedent's gross estate; or (3) stock in a
corporation carrying on a trade or business if the corporation had
no more than 10-shareholders or if 20 per cent or more in value
of'the voting stock of the company is included in decedent's gross
estate. Determinations are made as of the time immediately preced-
ing decednt's 'death.
The-el cfion is not permitted unless the value of the interest of
'the closely-held business included in decedent's gross estate exceeds
either 35 per cent Of the value of his total gross estate, or 50
per cent of the value of his taxable estate (based upon federal estate
tax Values). The maximum amount of tax deferable is that percentage
of the total estatejtax (reduced by credits) which is the same as the
ratio of the value- of the interest in the closely held business to the
value of the entire gross estate. If more than 50 per cent of the
total value of each' of two or more closely held businesses is included
in decedent's gross estate, they are treated as an interest in a single
business. For this purpose and also in order to determine the propor-
tion of the tax which is deferable and whether withdrawals have been
made from the business which terminate the option to defer the tax,
an interest in a closely held business which represents the surviving
spouse's interest in property held by decedent and such spouse as com-
munity property is considered included in determining the value of
decedent's gross estate.
There are also provisions making the entire amount of the unpaid
tax due immediately if: (1) aggregate withdrawals of money or other
property from the closely held business equal or exceed 50 per cent
6 15 months after decedent's death. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6075(a), 6151. For
extensions, see Jnt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6161(a)(2). An amendment to § 6161(a)(2)
permits extensions of time to pay installments of the tax in cases of undue hardship.
Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, § 206(c), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6655, 85th Cong, 2d Sess. (1958).
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of its value, or (2) 50 per cent or more of its value is distributed,
sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of, except for (a) distribu-
tions in redemption of stock under section 303, provided an amount
of the tax equal to the distribution is promptly paid, (b) certain
stock exchanges under sections 355 and 368, and (c) transfers by the
executor to legatees, heirs, or distributees. There is also a provision
requiring accelerated payment under certain conditions where the
estate has undistributed net income.
Four minor amendments described in last year's Annual Survey
were enacted in the 1958 Act. 7 An additional amendment granting
the privileges of sections 2039(c) and 2517(b) of the 1954 Code
to certain retirement annuity contracts purchased by tax-exempt
organizations for employees under nonqualified plans was also
enacted."
Section 43 (a) of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958 amends
section 1015 of the 1954 Code to allow the donee to increase his basis
for donated property by the amount of the gift tax paid on the gift,
provided that in no case may the basis exceed the fair market value
of the property at the time of the gift.9 The amendment applies to
property acquired by gift on and after September 2, 1958, and to
property so acquired before then but not disposed of until after
that date.
Section 93 of the Act also amends the 1939 Code retroactively to
April 1, 1948 to allow a marital deduction in the case of the life
estate power of appointment exception to the terminable interest rule
even if there is no trust, and even if the surviving spouse does not
have the right to the entire income or a power over the entire
property.10 Refunds, without interest, are allowed if the claim there-
for is filed not later than September 2, 1959.
7 Technical Amendments Act of 1998, §§ 65-68, U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6620-24, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) [§§ 53-55, 57 of the original House bill, H.R. 8381,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)], described in 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 113-14 nn.8-9, In 1957
Ann. Survey Am. L. 161-62 nn.8-9 (1958). As finally enacted, § 68 of the Act
(§ 57 of H.R. 8381), which adds § 2517 to the 1994 Code (exempting from the gift
tax an irrevocable election by an employee to have benefits to which he has an unqualified
right paid a survivor under qualified pension plans, so far as the employer's con-
tributions are concerned), specifically states its enactment is without prejudico to the
determination of the gift taxability of elections by employees under annuity plans
if made prior to 1955, the effective date of this section.8 Technical Amendments Act of 1958, § 23(e), (f), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
6578, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
9 The donee's basis in the case of gain is the same as the donor's adjusted basis at
the time of the gift; in the case of a loss, his basis is either that of the donor or
the fair market value at the time of the gift, whichever is lower. Int. Rev. Coda of
1954, § 1015.
10 Thus the rule becomes the same under the 1939 Code as under Int. Rev. Code
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Section 102 of the Act partially removes an anomaly by adding
section 2208 to the 1954 Code stating that a United States citizen
who is at death a resident of a United States possession is considered
a United States citizen for estate tax purposes unless he acquired
his citizenship solely because of being a citizen of the possession,
or by birth or residence in the possession. A similar provision
applies to the gift tax as well."' Also, credit or deduction
is now denied under sections 2011(a) and 2053(d)(1) for death
taxes of United States possessions, which are treated as foreign
countries under section 2014. This partially overrules decisions hold-
ing that United States citizens who were residents and citizens of
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands were exempt from the federal
estate tax.? II
REGULATIONS
A major development of 1958 was the release of the final estate
and gift tax regulations for the 1954 Code. 3 The fact that it took
approximately four years after enactment of the Code, and almost
two years after release of the proposed regulations, 14 to obtain the
final regulations speaks eloquently for itself.
Since the proposed estate and gift tax regulations have been
thoroughly discussed in the Annual Survey and elsewhere," attention
here will be directed mainly to the differences between the proposed
and final regulations. In general, one may say that the differences
are mainly ones of omission-by and large parts of the proposed
regulations which ventured into controversial areas to assert tax
liability have been omitted in the final regulations. The significance
of such omissions remains to be seen.
Thus the proposed estate tax regulations' specified that a transfer
of 1954, § 2056(b)(5). 1958 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 42, at 116. A section in the House
bill [H.R. 8881, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)] relating to a power of invasion of the
surviving spouse was not enacted. See 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 127 n.70, in 1957 Ann. Survey
Am. L. 175 n.70 (1958).
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2501(b), added by Technical Amendments Act of
1958, § 102(b), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6642, 8Sth Cong, 2d Sess. (195S).
32 Arthur S. Fairchild, 24 T.C, 408 (1955). Cf. Commissioner v. Rivera's Estate,
214 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1954); Albert DeCaen Smallwood, II T.C. 740 (1948).
13 See Lowndes, Summary and Analysis of Final Estate Tax Regulations, 97 Trusts
& Estates 708, 787 (1958); Rodman, New Estate Tax Regulations on Estates of
Nonresidents Not Citizens, id. 712.
14 The Code was approved August 16, 1954. The proposed estate tax regulations
were filed on Oct. 15, 1956; the final regulations on June 23, 1958. The proposed
gift tax regulations were filed Jan. 2, 1957; the final regulations on Nov. 14, 1958.
15 See 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 113 n.4, in 1957 Ann. Survey Am. L. 161 nA (195S), and
references there cited; 32 W.Y.U.L. Rev. 739, in 1956 Ann. Survey Am. L. 145 (1957).
16 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2043-1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 7886 (1956).
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of property Which (or the, income from which) was to be used to
support a dependent whom the decedent was legally obligated to sup-
port was not one for an adequate consideration under the estate tax un-
less (1) under local law it operated to discharge completely the
decedent's obligation (the proposed regulations' asserted that dece-
dent's obligation was merely discharged pro tanto by each support pay-
ment, and not by the original transfer, so a transfer in trust to support
a dependent would be taxable under 'section 2036 if the trust and the
dependency 'relationship existed when decedent died), or (2) it was
made pursuant to a court decree (or approved by or incorporated in
the decree) in a divorce, annulment or separate maintenance proceed-
ing. Even if made pursuant to such a court decree, it was taxable
to the extent it involved payments to children beyond the time when
decedent's obligation to support them would have ended (had he
lived) except for the decree. Similarly, a claim against the estate
was not deductible under section 2053 because of lack of adequate
consideration if based upon an agreement to support a dependent
after decedent's death unless embodied in such a court decree.'7
All these provisions are omitted in the final estate tax regulations.
1 8
There was also a provision i4 the proposed gift tax10 regulations
that a transfer of property which (or the income from which) was to
be used in the future to discharge a donor's obligation to support a
dependent was not one for adequate consideration unless by local law
the transfer completely discharged the donor's obligation. The final
regulations omit this statement.;0 Moreover, the final gift tax regula-
tions21 omit a provision in the proposed regulations 2 that current
expenditures to satisfy an obligation to support a spouse or minor
child are not taxable gifts. It is difficult to believe that thiq omission
indicates a belief of the Treasury that such expenditures would
normally be taxable' gifts.23 Finally, the proposed gift tax regula-
tions24 provided that a transfer in settlement of 'a spouse's propdrty
rights arising out of marriage was not taxable if it either (1) fell
within the scope of section 2516 of the 1954 Code by being made
pursuant to a written agreement between the spouses entered into
within two years prior to a final divorce decree; or (2) did not fall
17 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-4(b), 21 Fed, Reg. 7889 (1956),
18 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2043-1(b), .2053-4 (1958).
19 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8, 22 Fed. Reg. 63 (1957).
20 Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
22 Treas. Reg. § 26.2511-1(g)() (1958).
22 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(f)(1), 22 Fed. Reg. 58 (1957).
23 Cf. Lowndes & Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 741-43 (19S6).
24 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1(a) (c), 22,Fed. Reg. 73 (1957). Cf. Tomlinson,
Support Trusts and Gifts to Minors, 97 Trusts & Estates 929 (1958); Note, Property
Settlements and the Federal Gift Tax-A Survey, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 639 (1958).
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within the scope of section 2516 but was effected by a court decree,
either because (a) the agreement was conditioned upon entry of a
divorce decree and was incorporated therein, or (b) the transfer was
made solely pursuant to a divorce, separation, or annulment decree,
with no prior out-of-court agreement between the spouses. The final
regulations omit this provision.2 Does this indicate that the Treasury
contends that section 2516 impliedly repudiates the doctrine of the
Harris26 case so that any transfer not within the exact pattern of
section 2516 is taxable? This construction seems harsh and unwar-
ranted.2 7
The proposed estate tax regulations2 contained rather obscure
and puzzling provisions regarding the taxation of the proceeds of
insurance on decedent's life used to fund agreements for the purchase
of partnership or corporate interests from his estate. The final regula-
tions29 omit these entirely. The proposed estate tax regulations"
also dealt at some, length- in a not too satisfactory manner with the
valuation of such interests subject to restrictive purchase agreements.
They specified that "ordinarily, no effect?' was given in valuing the
interest to the agreement if decedent was free to dispose of it at any
price while alive. The final regulations3' provide that "little weight"
is given to such an arrangement; perhaps this infers that it may
depress the value to some extent. The proposed estate tax regula-
-tions,32 contrary to several court decisions, 33 asserted that an agree-
ment "amounting onlyto a right of first refusal during the decedent's
life" was considered to leave decedent free to dispose of the securities
while alive. The final regulations3" omit this statement. The proposed
estate tax regulations3 5 also stated that the agreement, even if effective
during decedent's life, did not control valuation unless full and
adequate consideration was given for the contract or option when
25 Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-1(a) (1958).
26 Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
27 Cf. Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 322-23, 746-47.
28 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-I(c)(6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7886 (19S6). See Kirm-
brough, Buy-Sell Agreements, 97 Trusts & Estates 925 (1958); Laikin, Survivor Pur-
chase Agreements and Taxes, id. 880; Strecker, Buy-Sell Agreements: Tax Problems in
Drafting, 15 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 18 (1958); Note, The Use of Life Insurance to Fund
Agreements Providing for Disposition of a Business Interest at Death, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
687 (1958).
29 Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (1958).
30 ProposedTreas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h), 21 Fed. Reg. 7867 (1956).
31 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
32 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h), 21 Fed. Reg. 7867 (1956).
33 Brodrick v. Gore, 224 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1955); May v, McGowan, 194 F2d
396 (2d Cir. 1952); Lionel Well, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954); Albert L. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951).
But cf. Robert R. Gannon, 21 E.C. 1073 (1954).
34 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958).
35 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h), 21 Fed. Reg. 7867 (1956).
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originally made. There was a presumption in favor of such considera-
tion except where there was an arrangement with the natural objects of
his bounty. The final regulations, 36 no doubt wisely, do not attempt
to spell out the matter but simply assert that the price in the restric-
tive agreement is disregarded in valuation unless the circumstances
reveal a "bona fide business arrangement" and not a device to pass
the business interest to a natural object of decedent's bounty for
inadequate consideration.
The proposed estate tax regulations, 7 following judicial deci-
sions, 8 provided that when a joint tenant or tenant by the entirety
transferred his interest in the jointly-owned property and severed the
tenancy in contemplation of death, only the transferor's fractional
share of the property (not the part proportionate to his contribution
to its acquisition, which -would have been taxed to his estate in the
absence of the transfer in contemplation of death) is taxed to his
estate. The final regulations39 omit this provision, no doubt because,
however equitable the result may be in the case of jointly owned
property, the possibilities for tax avoidance are large if the same
principle is applied, as logic would require, to other inter vivos
transfers in contemplation of death. Thus, in the case of the release
in contemplation of death of a reserved life estate, a reversionary
interest, or incidents of ownership in life insurance, the final regula-
tions expressly state that not merely the value of the string which
is relinquished, but the value of all the property taxable but for the
transfer of the string, is taxable." Here, unlike powers to alter or
amend or powers of appointment,4 there is no express provision in
the Code requiring taxation not merely of the "string" transferred in
contemplation of death but of the entire property otherwise taxable
if the "string" is not cut before death. It remains to be seen whether
in the case of such a transfer only the value of the transferred string
or interest-the reversion, life estate, etc.-is taxable because only
that interest is transferred in contemplation of death, or whether the
36 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1958). Cf. Orville B. Littick, 31 T.C. 21 (1958).
See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 533-40, 928-31; Langenderfer
Valuation in Estate Planning, 10 S.C.L.Q. 649 (1958); Note, 41 Marq. L. Rev. 48 (1957).
37 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(d), 21 Fed. Reg. 7879 (1956).
38 See Sullivan v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1949); Edward Carnall,
25 T.C. 654 (1955); A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955); Rev. Rul. 57-448, 1957-2
Cure. Bull. 618; Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 230-34, 314-17; Wright,
Transfers of Joint Property in Contemplation of Death-A Call for Immediate Statutory
Revision, 55 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1956); Note, Joint Tenancy and Estate Tax Avoidance:
A Widening Loophole for Transfers in Contemplation of Death, 66 Yale L.J. 142 (1956).
39 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (1958).
40 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2035-1(b), .2042-1(a)(2) (1958); Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1956-2
Cum. Bull. 999.
41 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2038(a), 2041 (a) (1) (B), (2).
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situation is to be viewed as if the transfer in contemplation of death
was of no effect so that the entire value of all the property subject to
the string is still taxable.
The proposed 42 and final43 estate tax regulations specify that if A
gives B outright $50,000 in stock which B sells, using the proceeds
to purchase bonds in his and A's names as joint tenants, the full value
of the bonds is taxed to A's estate if he predeceases B. If B, however,
after collecting $500 in dividends, sold the stock for a capital gain of
$1,000 and invested the proceeds and the dividends in bonds, the
proposed" and final45 regulations include the value of the bonds
in A's estate if he predeceased B, but apparently deduct therefrom
the proportionate amount for the $500 of interest as an independent
contribution by B. The proposed regulations"0 refuse to allow any
proportionate deduction for the $1,000 of capital gain realized by
B as B's independent contribution, but the final regulations T omit
this provision and appear to allow realized (but not unrealized) capital
gain as an independent contribution by B. They appear to state that
any income (which would seem to include realized capital gains)
earned by the donated property after the gift by A is regarded as B's
independent contribution (the example in the final regulations may
possibly mean only that income attributable to B's original contribu-
tion, if any, to the acquisition of the property, is excluded), and so
itis not taxed to A."
The final gift tax regulations 9 point out that when A creates a
joint bank account for himself and B, and B makes withdrawals for
his (B's) benefit, there is a gift only "to the extent of the amount
drawn without any obligation to account for a part of the proceeds to
A." The same principle applies to United States savings bonds payable
to A and B. The proposed regulations omitted the quoted language.'
The final gift tax regulations contain several changes in regard
to section 2515. This section provides that there is no tax upon the
creation of a tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy between spouses
in real property, unless the donor spouse elects to the contrary. Under
section 2515(b) there is a tax upon the termination of such a tenancy,
other than by a tenant's death, if one spouse receives a larger propor-
4 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (2), -1(c) (4), 21 Fed. Reg. 7879 (1956).
43 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a)(2), -1(c)(4) (1958).
44 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (2), -1(c) (5), 21 Fed. Reg. 7879 (19S6).
45 Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (2), -1(c) (5) (1958).
46 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1(a) (2), 21 Fed. Reg. 7879 (1956).
47 Treas. Reg. §. 20.2040-1(a) (2), -1(c) (4), -1(c) (5) (1958).
48 In Harvey v. United States, 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950), the court included
unrealized capital gain, but excluded all income and realized capital gain, in this situation.
49 Treas. Rg. § 25.2511-1(h) (4) (1958).
5o Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(4), 22 Fed. Reg. 59 (1957).
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tion of the proceeds of the property than the proportionate amount of
the consideration furnished by that spouse for the acquisition of the
property. When the property is sold or disposed of, there is ordinarily
a termination of the tenancy, except where the property received in
exchange is held in an identical tenancy or the proceeds are reinvested
within a reasonable time in property held in an identical tenancy. The
final regulations,5' unlike the proposed ones,52 further provide that
if the proceeds upon termination of a tenancy are applied to the
purchase or construction of improvements which constitute real prop-
erty and are made to other real property held in an identical tenancy
to that of the property disposed of, the proceeds are deemed to be
used for the purchase of the other real property and so are not subject
to a gift tax at that time. In addition, the final regulations,"3 unlike
the proposed ones,"- state that any increase in indebtedness on a
tenancy is a termination of it to the extent of the increase, unless the
increase is offset by additions to the tenancy within a reasonable time
after the increase. These additions, to the extent of the increase in
the debt, are not treated as contributions by the spouses.
Finally, in measuring the proportion of consideration contributed
by each spouse, both the final and proposed regulations 5 state that
any readily measurable general appreciation in the value of the jointly
owned property between two successive contribution dates is con-
sidered additional consideration furnished by the spouse who furnished
the prior consideration, provided the appreciation can be determined
with reasonable certainty to be allocable to any particular previously
furnished consideration. The final regulations," unlike the proposed
ones, 57 provide that this same rule applies to a general depreciation in
value. Thus, suppose H and W in 1955 purchase for $15,000 real
property as joint tenants, H paying $10,000 and W $5,000. In 1960,
when the fair market value of the land is $21,000, W makes improve-
ments thereto of $5000. The property is then sold for $26,000. The
$6,000 appreciation results in an additional contribution by H of
$4,000 (10,000/15,000 X 6,000), and by W of $2,000 (5,000/15,000
X 6,000). H's total contribution is $14,000 (10,000 + 4,000) and W's
is $12,000 (5,000 + 2,000 + 5,000). 58
51 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d) (2) (i) (1958). Cf. Lamme, Joint Tollandes and tho
Gift Tax, 37 Neb. L. Rev. 255 (1958).
52 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1 (d) (2) (i), 22 Fed. Reg. 70 (1957).
53 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(i) (1958).
54 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(d)(2)(1), 22 Fed. Reg. 70 (1957).
55 Treas. Reg. § 25.251S4(c)(2) (1958).
56 Treas. Reg. § 2S:SlS-I(c)(2) (1958).
57 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2), 22 Fed. Reg. 70 (951)?
58 Treas. Reg. § 25.2515-1(c)(2) (example 2) (1958).
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The final estate tax regulations"0 state that a reversionary interest
and the necessary survivorship provisions do not make a transfer
taxable under section 2037 if possession or enjoyment of the property
can be obtained by a beneficiary during decedent's life through the
exercise: of a"general power of appointment (as defined in section
2041) exercisable immediately before decedent's death. Does this
imply the transfer is taxable if the beneficiary had a nontaxable
power? If so, questionsmay be raised.60
There are four important changes in regard to powers of ap-
pointment. The final estate tax regulations"' omit a provision of the
proposed regulations62 that a power exists at the date of death even if
decedent then and at all times since the power's creation lacked
physical, mental or legal capacity to exercise the power. This raises
the perplexing question of whether such a power, if not taxable under
section 2041, will qualify a life estate power of appointment interest
in a surviving spouse for the marital deduction under the exceptions
to the terminable interest rule of section 2056(b) (5)." The proposed
gift and estate tax regulations 4 contained a surprising statement that
a nontaxable power to invade property for the donee's support or
maintenance, while "not limited to the bare necessities of life" and
including "other reasonable living expenses," did not necessarily extend
to -"all expenditures that might be considered customary in the
decedent's position in life." This language indicated that a power
of invasion to maintain the donee in his accustomed standard of living
might be taxable if he usually lived on a lavish scale. The final gift
and estate- tax regulations6 remove this uncertainty by stating only
that support and maintenance are not limited to bare necessities, and
by giving as an example of a nontaxable power one exercisable by
the ;donee to provide "support in his accustomed manner of living."
Third, the proposed gift and estate tax regulations"' expressly asserted
that a disclaimer of a power over a portion only of the property
subject to the power, was a release, and therefore taxable, instead of
59 Treas. Reg. § 20.2037-1(b) (1958).
60 See Lowndes, op. cit. supra note 13, at 760; Lowndes & Kramer, op. ciL supra
note 23, at 127-29.
61 Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b) (1958).
62 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 7882 (1956).
63 See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 257, 413 n.47, 415 n.S6. I
the power is not taxable, the property subject to it will not be included in the gross
estate of the surviving spouse. Could there be a marital deduction for it from the
estate of the prior deceased spouse?
64 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2), 21 Fed. Reg. 7881 (1956); Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-1(c)(2), 22 Fed. Reg. 66 (1957).
65 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(c) (2), 25.2514-1(c) (2) (1958).
66 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7884 (1956); Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c) (5), 22 Fed. Reg. 68 (1957).
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a nontaxable disclaimer or renunciation. The final gift and estate tax
regulations 67 more leniently provide that such a partial disclaimer
may be nontaxable if there is a complete and unqualified refusal to
accept the rights compatible with all the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, and if the partial disclaimer is effective under
local law. The final gift and estate tax regulations,"8 unlike the
proposed ones,69 give specific examples concerning the time of creation
of a power in an inter vivos instrument executed before October 22,
1942. The examples illustrate that, as stated in the proposed regula-
tions, the power is considered a post-1942 one if the instrument
creating it was revocable by the settlor until after October 21, 1942;
on the other hand, a power is considered a pre-1942 one if the holder
acquired it after October 21, 1942 by reason of appointment as a
successor trustee by the original trustee (who was not the settlor),
the original trustee having no right to create the power (if the donee
receives the power as a new power created after October 21, 1942
by the original trustee, the power is a post-1942 one). The examples
also illustrate that contrary to a statement in the proposed regulations,
a power acquired by the holder after October 21, 1942, as a result of
the mere failure of another person to exercise a power, is not a post-
1942 power.
There are extensive differences between the proposed and final
estate tax regulations so far as treatment of section 2039 is concerned.
Four points deserve mention here. First, the proposed regulations 0
limited the exclusion from estate taxation granted by section 2039(c)
for employer contributions to survivorship annuities which are part
of a qualified pension, stock bonus, or profit sharing plan, to amounts
which would, "if it were not for section 2039(c), be includible in
the decedent's gross estate under section 2039(a) and (b)." The final
regulations71 omit this limitation and seem more in accord with the
statutory language which provides for the exclusion "notwithstanding
the provisions of this section or of any provision of law." Thus, bene-
67 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-3(d) (6), 25.2514-3(c) (5) (1958).
68 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-1(e), 25.2514-1(e) (1958). For a decision that a trust
created before 1942 but revocable by the settlor until 1946, which gave decedent settlor
a general power of appointment resulted in a pre-1942 power, nontaxable because not
exercised, see Merchants Natl Bank v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 827 (S.D. Ala, 1957).
This is contrary to both the final and proposed regulations.
69 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(e), 21 Fed. Reg. 7881 (1956) ; Proposed Treas-
Reg. § 25.2514-1(e), 22 Fed. Reg. 66 (1957).
70 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(a), 21 Fed. Reg. 7878 (1956).
71 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(a) (1958). See Moses, How Estate Tax Regulations
Affect Estate Planning for Pension and Profit Sharing Interests, 97 Trusts & Estates
616 (1958); Stock, Planning the Disposition of Employee Death Benefits, 96 id. 972
(1957).
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fits in the nature of insurance, contrary to an express statement in the
proposed regulations,72 seem covered by the exclusion under section
2039(c), as indicated by an express statement in the final regula-
tions.73 Second, an example added by the final regulations74 makes it
clear that if an employee has "constructively received" all amounts due
him under a qualified pension plan, then the exclusion granted by
section 2039(c) does not apply because the surviving beneficiary
receives the designated amount from the deceased employee directly
and not as a beneficiary under a pension plan. So if a deceased
employee before death and at retirement selected an option which
left all amounts due him under a pension plan with a trustee, with
interest to be paid to the employee during his life and principal to be
paid to the beneficiary at his death, but with the employee retaining the
privilege of withdrawing all principal at any time before death, the
employee has constructively received all amounts due under the
pension plan, and the exclusion of section 2039(c) does not apply to
any amounts paid the beneficiary at his death, even if the deceased
had withdrawn none of the principal. Third, the final regulations"
state that the decedent has an enforceable right to receive future an-
nuity payments at death "so long as he had complied with his obliga-
tions under the contract or agreement up to the time of his death." The
mere fact the employee would forfeit his rights if he severed his
employment does not matter under the final regulations if he, in fact,
was employed at the time of his death.70 Fourth, an example added
by the final regulations77 makes it clear that a single lump sum
payment to a beneficiary may qualify for the exclusion granted by
section 2039(c), provided decedent at his death had an enforceable
right to future payments for himself (as, for example, when he bad
not yet retired), or was then receiving annuity payments. The right
to a future payment possessed by decedent may be a right to a lump
sum payment only, so far as section 2039 is concerned.18
72 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(a), 21 Fed. Reg. 7878 (1956).
73 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (example 3) (1958).
74 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (example 4) (1958).
75 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (1) (1958).
76 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) (example 3) (1958). See Eli L. Garber, P-H Tax
Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. f 121 (1958); Charles B. Wolf, 29 T.C. 441 (1957) (unlimited
power to designate beneficiaries under irrevocable annuity held a general power of ap-
pointment taxable under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041; decedent had enforceable rights
even if he forfeited them if he was discharged for cause or deliberately quit his job);
Rev. Rul. 58-307, 195S Int. Rev. Bull. No. 25, at 16; Pincus, Estate Taxation of An-
nuities and Other Payments, 44 Va. L. Rev. 857 (1958); Notes, Estate Taxation of Con-
tract Rights Subject to Conditions Precedent, 67 Yale LJ. 467 (1958), Estate Taxation
of Employee Death Benefits, 66 id. 1217 (1957); 58 Colum. L. Rev. 124 (1958).
77 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (example 2) (1958).
78 Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2) (example 5), -2(b) (example 2) (1958).
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The final gift tax regulations70 contain a brief reference only to
the effect of section 2517, under which transfers of survivor annuities
in connection with qualified pension and profit sharing plans, which
are exempt under the estate tax, are also exempted from the gift tax.
Curiously enough, this reference'is to "section 2517 and the regula-
tions thereunder," although there do not seem to be any regulations
under section 2517, or; at least, if there are, they are not included
in the final gift tax regulations.
In dealing with valuation problems, the final estate tax regula-
tions increase from $50 to $100 the maximum value of furnishings
for a room which need not be listed separately. 80 Similarly, the maxi-
mum value for jewelry, art objects, and' other chattels not requiring
expert'appraisal israised from $2,000 to $3,000.81
Both the final82 and proposed 83 estate tax regulations require
dividends on corporate stock to be listed separately as part of the
deceased shareholder's estate, if the dividends were accrued but
unpaid at the date of death. Both also specify that the stockholder
record date is When aividends accrue. In fact, the language of the
final regulations8 4 foe the first time, eliminates possible ambiguity on
this point which the language of the proposed regulations contained
(the language of the proposed regulations 5 could be construed to
specify the declaration date instead of the record date as the time of
accrual). This means that if a shareholder dies after the record date
but before the dividiend is paid, it is listed separately, If he dies
before the record date but after the declaration date, the dividend's
value is reflected in th6 market price of the stock, unless the stock
is quoted ex dividend on the day of death. Here the dividend will
escape tax unless listed separately or added to the market price of
the stock. The final regulations,80 following a Tax Court decision,87
assert that under these circumstances the value, of the stock is not
the ex dividend price but rather the ex dividend price plus the amount
of the dividend. How this principle can be applied if the alternate
valuation date is elected is not clear. 88
The proposed estate tax regulations89 seemed to state that if the
79 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(10) (1958). See note 7 supra.
80 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(a) (1958).
81 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(b) (1958).
82 Treas. Reg. '§§ 20.2033-1(b), .2032-1(d)(4) (1958).
83 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 7872 (1956); Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d)(iv), 21 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1956).
84 Treas. Reg. § -20.2033-1(b) (198).
85 Proposed TreAs. Reg. § 20.2033-1(b), 21 Fed. Reg. 7872 (1956).
86 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(j) (1958).
87 George McNaught Lockie, 21 T.C. 64 (1953).
88 See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 35-38, 466-68.
89 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d) (1) (iv), 21 Fed. Reg. 7871 (1956).
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alternative valuation date was chosen, all stock dividends declared
-within a year of decedent's death on securities included in his gross
estate were taxable. The final regulations,°0 perhaps in deference to
a court decision excluding stock dividends declared after a transfer
of securities by decedent in contemplation of death but before the
date of death,91 state that such stock dividends are included in the
gross esiate only if they represent earnings and profits accumulated
prior to the date of death, where decedent owned a substantial interest
in the corpbration.
The final estate tax regulations 2 also refer expressly to "the
degree of- control of the business represented by the block of stock
to be valued," as one of the relevant factors to be considered in valuing
securities Where actual sale or bid and asked prices are lacking.
The final estate tax regulations0 3 omit the paragraphs of the
proposed regulations94 which specifically dealt with the valuation of
property included in the gross estate under sections 2036, 2037 and
2038, excluding therefrom the value of improvements or additions
to the property made by the transferee before decedent's death. A
similar exclusion in the valuation of property transferred in contempla-
tion of death (in addition to the exclusion of income from the
property) was retained in the final regulations. 5 What inferences can
be drawn from this as to the Treasury's attitude toward these per-
plexing questions 90 is far from clear.
The final estate and gift tax regulations,97 like the proposed
ones92 recognize blockage in valuation, but also state that "complete
9o Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(d)(4) (1958).
91 McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958). The court indicated
the, stock dividends might be taxable if they represented earnings and profits made
prior to the transfer by decedent (in the case the dividends mainly represented earnings
subsequent to the transfer). See 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 124-25, in 1957 Ann. Survey Am.
L. 172-73 (1958); Comments, 62 Dick L. Rev. 280 (1958), 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 91
(1957), 25 U. Chli. L. Rev. 372 (1958); 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 513.
92 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(f) (1958). Cf. Bartram v. Graham, 157 F. Supp. 757
(D. Conn. 1957); Edgar F. Luckenbach, P-H TC Memo 1958-38; Florence M. Harrison,
P-H Tax CL Rep. & Mem. Dec. 1958-157; Mancina, How to Make an Estate Tax Valua-
tion of a Going Concern, 36 Taxes 491 (1958); Rockefeller, Valuation of Closely Held
Stocks for Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 36 id. 259.
93 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1, .2037-1, .2038-1 (1958).
94 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(c), .2037-1(e), .2038-I(c), 21 Fed. Reg. 7873,
7874, 7876 (1956).
95 Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1958). The proposed regulations, Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 20.2035-1(e), 21 Fed. Reg. 7872 (1956), contain the same section.
96 See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 468-74.
97 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-2(e), 25.2512-2(e) (1958).
"8 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2(e), 21 Fed. Reg. 7866 (1956); Proposed Treas.
Reg. § 25.2512-2(e), 22 Fed. Reg. 61 (1957). The proposed gift tax regulations also
contained the language quoted above in the text.
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data in support of any allowance claimed due to the size of the block
of stock being valued shall be submitted."
The final estate tax regulations,99 in spite of a contrary decision
of the Tax Court, °0 reaffirm (with an added example) the position
of the proposed regulations'' that a widow's allowance during ad-
ministration of an estate is an interest passing from the decedent and
may qualify for the marital deduction if it is not a terminable interest.
The final estate tax regulations'0 2 also emphasize the disallowance of
a marital deduction in several recent court decisions 0 3 where the
widow was given a life interest with a power to consume or invade the
principal, but not to dispose of it by will. The final gift and estate tax
regulations assert, as did the decisions, that this type of power is not
one exercisable in all events, and, therefore, it is not eligible for the
marital deduction under the life estate power of appointment excep-
tion to the terminable interest rule. Frequently local law will impose
restrictions despite the broad language of decedent's will. The final
gift and estate tax regulations further state that the donee or surviving
"spouse must have the unrestricted power exercisable at any time dur-
ing her life to use all or any part of the property subject to the power,
and to dispose of it in any manner, including the power to dispose of it
by gift (whether or not she has power to dispose of it by will)."
The final estate tax regulations 0 4 on the credit for prior transfers
omit the clause in the proposed regulations'"° that if the interest
received by decedent from the transferor could not be valued by
actuarial principles, it was considered to have no value. It is not
clear if this means the Treasury will allow a credit for a contingent
interest.
In the case of gifts to third persons by one spouse, the final regula-
tions 0 provide that the election to split the gift with the other
99 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(b)-l(g) (example 8), (e)-2(a) (1958). Cf. Edward A.
Cunha, 30 T.C. No. 80 (June 30, 1958).
100 Proctor D. Rensenhouse, 27 T.C. 107 (1956), remanded, 252 F.2d 566 (6th
Cir. 1958) (Government abandoned ground on which Tax Court decided case).
101 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a), 21 Fed. Reg. 7904 (1956).
102 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(g)(3) (1958). To the same effect is the identical
section in the proposed estate tax regulations, Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-
5(g) (3), 21 Fed. Reg. 7900 (1956), and a section in the final gift tax regulations. Treas.
Reg. § 25.2523(e)-l(g)(3) (1958).
103 Tarver v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958); Commissioner v. Estate
of Ellis, 252 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1958) ; Estate of Pipe v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 210 (2d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957), 71 Harv. L. Rev. 381 (1957), 9 Syracuse
L. Rev. 112 (1957); William C. Allen, 29 T.C. 465 (1957), 18 Md. L. Rev. 171 (1958);
Wallace S. Howell, 28 T.C. 1193 (1957); Note, 46 Ky. L.J. 586 (1958).
104 Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-4(a) (1958). Cf. Rudick, The Estate Tax Credit for
Tax on Prior Transfers, 13 Tax L. Rev. 3 (1957).
105 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2013-4(a), 21 Fed. Reg. 7858 (1956).
1o6 Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-2(a) (1958). Cf. Alex Frieder, 28 T.C. 1256 (1957).
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spouse where both file returns may be signified either (1) by both
spouses on one return; (2) by each spouse on his or her return only;
or (3) by each spouse on the other's return. The proposed regula-
tions1°7 did not recognize the second category.
The final gift tax regulations,08 unlike the proposed ones,103 no
longer require the filing of information returns by donees, trustees,
or- trust beneficiaries.
The determination of whether a settlor has made a taxable gift
when he has reserved powers over the donated property exercisable
only with the consent of other persons, or has conferred such powers
only upon persons other than himself, depends upon whether the
holders (other than the settlor) of the powers have a substantial
adverse interest in the disposition of the property or its income. '
The significance to be attached to the fact that the holders of the
powers may be close relatives of the settlor is not clear, since the courts
have expressed varying views on this problem."' The proposed gift
tax regulations" contained the puzzling assertion: "Nor is a person
considered as having an adverse interest in the property or income
solely by reason of his standing as a spouse or relative of the donor."
Unless the word "donor" is a misprint for "donee," it is hard to
understand why a relationship to the donor would give the power
holder an interest adverse to the donor; the usual feeling is that such
a relationship only weakens an otherwise substantial adverse interest.
The final regulations113 wisely omit this sentence.
In many instances the determination of whether a taxable gift has
been made by a donor depends upon whether a reserved power or
a power conferred on a third person is a fiduciary one, the exercise
or nonexercise of which is limited by a standard." 4 This is true when
a trustee having a beneficial interest in the trust transfers the property
to another, or where the donor reserves power to name new bene-
ficiaries or change the interests of the beneficiaries as between them-
selves, or where the donor transfers property to himself as trustee
and retains only a power to change the beneficiaries, or where the
trustee has a discretionary power to pay the settlor income. The
proposed gift tax regulations'" stipulated that the standard must be
107 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2513-2(a), 22 Fed. Reg. 64 (1957).
108 Treas. Reg. §§ 25.6001-1v .6011-1 (1958).
109 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 25.6001-2, .6011-1(a), 22 Fed. Reg. 83 (1957).
110 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 694-98.
-11 Id. at 703-04.
112 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e), 22 Fed. Reg. 60 (1957).
113 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(e) (1958).
114 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 707-08, 710-13.
115 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(f)(2), -2(b), (c), (g), 22 Fed. Reg. 58-60
(1957).
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limited by a "reasonably fixed or readily ascertainable standard which
is set forth in the trust instrument." The final regulations'" require
an "ascertainable," not "a readily ascertainable" standard, in these
situations-perhaps a more lenient test.
Transfers by a corporation are treated as gifts by the stockholders
to the donees. If one of the stockholders is also a donee, the proposed
regulations"17 stated there was a gift to him by the other shareholders
to the extent there was not a distribution of earnings or liquidation
to which he was entitled as a stockholder. The final regulations" 8
more simply state that there is a gift to the donee shareholder only
to the extent that what he receives exceeds his own interest in this
amount as a shareholder.
The question of the gift tax treatment of refusals by heirs or
legatees to accept legacies or property from a decedent has proved
a troublesome one. The proposed regulations,"19 following the distinc-
tion made by several courts, 20 stated that a "renunciation of a vested
property interest," where title immediately vested under local law in
the devisee or heir at decedent's death, was a taxable gift. Renuncia-
tion where title did not immediately vest under local law was not a
gift if all the property was renounced within a reasonable time. The
final regulations 121 avoid the use of the terms "devisee," "renuncia-
tion," or "vesting." Instead they state there is no gift if by local law
the beneficiary or heir or next-of-kin may completely and unqualifiedly
refuse to accept ownership of the property, and does so. Whether the
transfer is effected by will or intestacy is immaterial. There is a gift
only if local law does not permit such a refusal, or does not allow the
beneficiary or heir to prevent himself from becoming owner of the
property. Moreover, the final regulations, as in the case of a disclaimer
or renunciation of a power of appointment, recognize that the refusal
may be valid and prevent a taxable gift even if it applies only to a part
of the property, depending upon the effect of such a refusal under local
law. The test of the final regulations seems more satisfactory and
not so strictly confined to technical concepts of property law as that
of the proposed regulations.
The final regulations 2 omit a statement in the proposed regula-
116 Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-1(g)(2), -2(b), (c), (g) (1958).
117 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g) (1), 22 Fed. Reg. 59 (1957).
118 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(h)(1) (1958).
119 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c), 22 Fed. Reg. 58 (1957). Cf. Kay,
Renunciations, Disclaimers, and Releases, 35 Taxes 767 (1957); Smith, Property and
Tax Consequences of Renunciations and Disclaimers, 96 Trusts & Estates 744 (1957);
Comment, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 48 (1957).
120 Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 682-83.
121 Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
122 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (1958).
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tions2 3 that an exclusion will not be allowed for a gift of an interest
which does not commence immediately or whose value cannot be
ascertained by accepted actuarial methods. Does this omission indicate
that an exclusion may be allowed in such cases?
The final regulations contain two important changes in regard to
section 2503(c). This section allows an exclusion for a gift to a minor
where the property and income may be expended by or for his benefit
during minority (before 21), with the unexpended portion passing
to him at 21, provided that if the donee dies during minority, the
undisposed property passes to his estate or as he may appoint under a
general power of appointment as defined in section 2514(c). The
proposed regulations 4 asserted that if by local law a minor was in-
capable of exercising a power of appointment, then a gift to a minor
would not qualify under section 2503 (c) for an exclusion even if the
minor had been given a general power of appointment. The final
regulations12 5 take exactly the opposite point of view and assert that
the fact that by local law a minor is incapable of exercising a general
power of appointment given to him does not disqualify the gift for the
exclusion under section 2503(c). This raises the question of whether
the property will be included in the minor's gross estate if, in such
a case, he dies before reaching 21. The final estate tax regulations 20
omit the provision of the proposed regulations that a power exists at
the date of death even if the holder lacks legal capacity to exercise
it. Since section 2503(c) requires a general power as defined in
section 2514(c), and since section 2514(c) defines a general power
in the same way as section 2041 of the estate tax, it would seem
that the minor's power should be taxable under section 2041 if the
intent of Congress is to be carried out. At least, there should be
consistency here between the gift and estate taxes. Moreover, the
final gift tax regulations -12 7 state that a failure to exercise a post-1942
general power caused by the incapacity of the holder because of his
minority is not a taxable lapse of the power. This seems inconsistent
with the treatment of such cases under the regulations for sec-
tion 2503(c).
The final regulations -1 28 state that under section 2503(c) there
may be left to the discretion of a trustee the determination of what
123 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b), 22 Fed. Reg. 56 (1957).
124 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b), 22 Fed. Reg. 57 (19S7).
125 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b) (1958).
126 See notes 61-62 supra.
127 Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c) (4) (1958).
128 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b) (1) (1958). Cf. Munger v. United States, 154 F. Supp.
417 (M.D. Ala. 1957); George M. Street, 29 T.C. 428 (1958); Lentz, Gifts-to-Minors
Problem Created by Subchapter S: Is Custodianship Answer?, 9 J. Taxation 344 (1958);
Tomlinson, Support Trusts and Gifts to Minors, 97 Trusts & Estates 929 (1958).
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amounts to expend for the minor's benefit and the purposes of the
expenditures, provided there are no substantial restrictions on the
exercise of this discretion. The proposed regulations 12 stated that
any person could have discretion to determine the amounts to be
expended and to limit them to those necessary for the minor's support,
health, or education, provided the discretion could not be exercised
to deny the donee's right to income or corpus in case of need. The final
regulations permit the grant of discretionary powers to a trustee only,
but allow and require a far wider grant of discretionary power to him,
so that it is possible that the minor may never obtain any income or
corpus at all before 21.
III
CASES
In the judicial realm, any decision of the Supreme Court is, of
course, noteworthy. Yet, the one case decided by that Court in 1958
dealing with the federal estate tax is not one which, irrespective of
whether the result is viewed favorably or otherwise, makes any sub-
stantial contribution to the law. In Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Smith,130 the majority of the Court in an opinion by the Chief Justice
reversed the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit1 '
and held nontaxable the proceeds of a single premium life insurance
policy when the insured decedent had retained no incidents of owner-
ship in the policy and had assigned it to her children, the beneficiaries.
In order to obtain the insurance, decedent had purchased at the same
time from the insurer a single premium nonrefundable annuity on
her life, the combined premiums for the insurance and annuity
equalling 11/10 of the face amount of the policy. The majority
opinion, in a fashion strikingly reminiscent of the opinions of the
Court in the pre-Hallock'32 days of the estate tax, when the strictest
adherence to the most technical property concepts was emphasized,
simply reasoned that the annuity and insurance policy were two
129 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b) (1), 22 Fed. Reg. 57 (1957).
130 356 U.S. 274 (1958), 56 Mich. L. Rev. 1366 (1958). See Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
77, 109-112 (1958). Justices Burton, Black and Clark dissented in a brief opinion.
For criticism of the Court's work in the federal tax field, see the address of Dean
Griswold before the California State Bar, as reported in the Harv. L. Record Oct. 16,
1958, p. 3.
131 Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 197). Two
other courts of appeal and the Tax Court had reached the same result as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Conway v. Glenn, 193 F.2d 965 (6th Cir.
1952) ; Burr v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 871 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946) ;
Cora C. Reynolds, 45 B.T.A. 44 (1941). Contra, Bohnen v. Harrison, 199 F.2d 492 (7th
Cir. 1952), aff'd by an equally divided court, 345 U.S. 946 (1953). Cf. Caplin, Threats
to the Integrity of Our Tax System, 44 Va. L. Rev. 839, 851-52 n.34 (1998).
132 Helvering v. Halock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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separate "items of property," and viewing the insurance policy as a
separate contract, found no basis for including its proceeds in de-
cedent's gross estate. This reasoning, if it can be labeled such, of
course, assumes the whole point at issue and ignores the fundamental
problem of whether under the circumstances the decedent has not
simply in a "single integrated transaction" made a transfer with a
reservation of a life interest. For a Court which has so often ignored
form for substance, the reasoning of the majority opinion is remark-
able. From the standpoint of policy, there seems little social or
economic justification for allowing this peculiar arrangement to
escape the estate tax, even if it is probably available only to a
relatively small group of individuals. No doubt Congress can close
this gap if it chooses, but to do so will require skilled draftsmanship
and will further burden a cumbersome Code with added provisions
to deal with minute details. Perhaps the majority simply felt it was
time for a taxpayer to win a victory and that this case was a good
one to accomplish that result. One can hope that this type of reason-
ing will not be followed in future tax cases decided by the Supreme
Court.
In the lower courts there were few decisions of more than passing
interest. Two courts13 3 ruled that the right of a decedent's estate to
share in the post-death income of his partnership should be included
in his gross estate under section 2033, the right being valued as of the
date of death. One case134 involved a department store with sub-
stantial capital, the other1 35 a law firm with little capital. Both
opinions had to overcome the obstacles raised by the Supreme Court
opinion in the Bull case, 3 ' where the post-death income from a
partnership was held not taxable under the estate tax for reasons not
fully clear (one possible ground being that the Treasury attempted
to tax the actual amount of the post-death payments received by the
estate rather than the value of the right to receive them, estimated as
of the date of death). Both opinions were able to distinguish the facts
of the Bull case from the facts of the case in question,1 37 but both
also proceeded further and indicated a belief that the Bull case is no
133 Estate of Riegelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 195S), 42 Minn.
L. Rev. 1187 (1958); 45 Geo. L.. 698 (1957); Winkle v. United States, 160 F. Supp.
348 (WM. Pa. 1958). In the Winkle case, the valuation raised interesting problems.
134 Winkle v. United States, supra note 133.
135 Estate of Riegelman v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1958).
136 Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
137 In Riegelman, unlike Bull, the agreement did not provide for continuation
of the partnership with decedent's estate as a partner (sharing both losses and profits).
In Winkle, unlike Bull, the partnership owned valuable tangible property and bad a
large capital investment by the partners.
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longer law and not likely to be followed by the Supreme Court today
-a prophecy which seems reasonable.' 38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 89 ruled
that a transfer after March 3, 1931, but prior to the effective date of
the 1932 amendments to section 2036, was not taxable when the
settlor's right to income for life was postponed until the death of
another life beneficiary who survived the settlor. The court felt that
such a transfer was taxable not as one for the transferor's life or "for
any period which does not in fact end before" the transferor's death,
but rather as one "for any period not ascertainable without reference
to his death," the prior phrase being a clarifying change made by
the 1932 Act, the last being new matter, not retroactive, added by
it. The court's conclusion seems open to question (for it assumes
that the exact transfer involved in May v. Heiner140 was not taxable
under the joint resolution of 1931141 enacted to repudiate the May
case), but in accord with the new regulations. 142
The Tax Court143 decided that when the grantor made an ir-
revocable transfer in trust for his wife and children and provided
for invasion of corpus for the benefit of the income beneficiaries under
certain circumstances (which never occurred), the mere fact that
he reserved the power to veto any distribution of corpus before
termination of the trust did not make it taxable to his estate. The
court reasoned that his veto power was a contingent one, the con-
tingency did not occur prior to his death, and, therefore, the trust was
not taxable under either section 2038 or section 2036.'"
A district court 145 decided that when a beneficiary could obtain
possession of property transferred before 1949 by decedent either by
surviving decedent or by a power to terminate the transfer, whichever
occurred first, theproperty was not taxable under section 2037.
A United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deci-
138 Cf. McClennen v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942); Lowndes &
Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 38-42.
139 Estate of Hubbard v. Commissioner, 250 F.2d 492 (5th Cir. 1957).
140 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
141 46 Stat. 1516 (1931). See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 134-
35, 139-40.
142 Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(1)(ii) (1958).
143 Frederick M. Kascb, 30 T.C. No. 9 (April 23, 1958).
144 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b)(3)(iii), .2038-1(b) (1958) (Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 2038 not applicable to contingent power; § 2036 may apply to this type of
power). The power to invade corpus would seem to be a power to affect the enjoyment
of income under § 2036. If the contingency were survivorship by the grantor, § 2037
might apply. See generally Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 116 n.28,
143-44, 167-70, 201-02.
145 Smith v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 344 (D. Colo. 1957). See Treas. Reg.§ 20.2037-1(b) (1958); Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 112-13.
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sion 14 16 held taxable under section 2037 an inter vivos transfer in
trust where the corpus at the settlor's death, if he had not created
other trusts, was to go to the trustee of the residuary estate under his
will. Answering the argument that the settlor had no reversionary
interest, the court pointed out that he had a power of disposition over
the corpus, which section 2037 expressly defines as a reversion.
Where a widow -waives all her vested interest in half of the com-
munity property and elects instead to take under her decedent hus-
band's will which gives her a life interest in the entire community
property, with remainders to children, it is clear that by her election
the widow makes a taxable gift to the children of her remainder in-
terest in her one-half of the community property. In valuing the
amount of this gift, several recent decisions have held that there
should be deducted therefrom the value of the life interest she
receives in the one-half of the community property belonging to dece-
dent, this one-half (but not her one-half) having been included in
his gross estate, of course 47 By similar reasoning, at the death
of the widow, her half (but not her husband's) of the community
property in which she has retained a life interest will be included
in her gross estate under section 2036, but there will again be deducted
therefrom the value of the life interest she received in her hus-
band's half of the community property. The theory is that she
has transferred the remainder interest to the children in considera-
tion of the receipt of the life estate in decedent's property. Whether
the doctrine of consideration should be applied to this type of intra-
family transaction is open to question; there may or may not be actual
arm's length bargaining in these cases if only relatives are involved.
Where the remaindermen are children, the natural objects of the
widow's bounty, the net result is to reduce sharply the tax cost to
her of a transfer she probably would have made in any event. The
transaction seems actuated by a desire to provide for her family,
not by busihess-bargaining.
146 Estate of Tarver v. Commissioner, 255 F2d 913 (4th Cir. 1958).
147 Commissioner v. Siegel, 250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957); Chase Nat'I Bank,
25 T.C. 617 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 231 (Sth Cir. 1958). The husband's
estate is taxable only on his half of the community property. Pacific Nat'! Bank, 40
B.T.A. 128 (1939); Coffman-Dobson Bank & Trust Co., 20 B.T.A. 890 (1930). But
cf. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 187-SS (1943). See Anderson, The Marital
Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes between Common
Law and Community Property States, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1037 (1956); Brown, The
Widow's Election as a Tax-Saving Device, 96 Trusts & Estates 30 (1957); Thurman,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property Life Insurance, 9 Stan. L. Rev.
239 (1957); Weingarten, Gift and Estate Tax Consequences of Widow's Election in
Community Property States, 42 A.B.A.J. 1163 (1956); Westfall, Estate Planning
and the Widow's Election, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1269 (1958); ALI Fed. Income, Estate
and GiftTax Stat. 40-41 (April 1956 Draft); Note, 34 Texas L. Rev. 1104 (1956).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
1958 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
The Tax Court has refused 148 to follow the Seventh Circuit14 and
has held constitutional the premium payment test under the 1939
Code for inclusion of proceeds of insurance on decedent's life payable
to beneficiaries other than his estate. The Tax Court ruled that the tax
was not a direct one on the proceeds, but a tax on the inter vivos
transfer of the insurance, with payment of the tax postponed until
death. Such a tax was a reasonable method to prevent avoidance of
the estate tax. Furthermore, the retroactive features of the tax were
not a violation of due process.
Under section 2055, a deduction is allowed for transfers (1) to or
for the use of any corporation "organized and operated exclusively"
for certain charitable purposes; or (2) to a trustee or trustees if
the property transferred is "to be used . . . exclusively for" certain
charitable purposes. The importance of this distinction between these
two categories is vividly illustrated by two recent cases. In one, the
court'50 construed a bequest of $5,000 as being made to the members
of the Rhode Island Bar Association in trust for limited charitable
purposes, and not to the Association outright (the Association ad-
mittedly was not devoted solely to the charitable purposes specified
in section 2055). A deduction was therefore allowed. In the second
case, '5 the court denied a deduction for bequests made outright to
New York city, county, and state bar associations, since the associa-
tions were not operated exclusively for the charitable purposes speci-
fied by section 2055.
The Court of Claims 52 ruled that where a surviving spouse
received real estate from decedent which at his death was subject to
an unpaid mortgage, the estate could deduct the amount of the unpaid
mortgage as a claim under section 2053, having included the property
at its full value in his gross estate. In addition, when the estate paid
off the mortgage, as it was required to do by local law, the full value
of the property could be deducted as a marital deduction. Under sec-
tion 2056(b) (4) (B), where the interest passing to the surviving spouse
is encumbered, the encumbrance is to be taken into account "in the
same manner as if the amount of a gift" to the spouse were involved.
When the donor discharges an encumbrance on donated property at
the same time as the gift, the gift is the full value of the property.1 '
148 Ellis Baker, 30 T.C. No. 76 (June 30, 1938); Clarence H. Loeb, 29 T.C. 22
(1957). See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 281-288.
149 Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1955).
150 Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 204 (D.R.I. 1958).
151 Dulles v. Johnson, 155 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The two opinions reach
opposite conclusions as to whether a substantial part of the activities of the legatees
consisted of carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation. See
Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 354-56.
152 Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 832 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
153 See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 493 n.139.
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The court pointed out that the situation was substantially the same
as if the decedent had bequeathed to his widow cash which she used
to pay off the mortgage-a marital deduction would be allowed for
both the cash and the value of the equity in the mortgaged land. The
court stressed that the situation here involved a claim owed to a
third person and not to the surviving spouse, and refused to distinguish
between cases where the debt was paid off at the direction of decedent
and where it was required to be paid by local law.1" 4
In Commissioner v. Vander Weele1' 5 the court held there was no
taxable gift when the settlor, a young woman, transferred a sub-
stantial sum to trustees, reserving some of the life income for herself
and giving the trustees power to invade principal and pay her the
remaining income for her comfortable well-being, the remaindermen
being her husband and children. The court stressed the fact that the
settlor's creditors under local law could reach her life interest and
that the real purpose of the trust was to preserve the property for
the settlor, so that very likely the remaindermen would never receive
anything. The court expressly distinguished other decisions imposing
a gift tax where payment of income or principal to the settlor was
discretionary with a person other than the grantor, 15a and also
decisions refusing to impose an estate tax here at the settlor's death." T
If such transfers are not taxable under the estate tax, they certainly
should not also escape the gift tax. The reasoning of the courts seems
to be to look at the actual facts and circumstances of each case and
not to impose a gift tax if the court is of the opinion that there is
little chance that anyone except the settlor will ever receive the
income or corpus.'18 If this approach is adopted, it would seem that
154 Cf. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2056(a)-2(b) (2), (3), .2056(b)-4((b) (1958), which are not
clear but seem contrary to the decision. See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23,
at 375-76. The court also rejected the argument that the interest deductible under Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 2053 did not pass from decedent to his spouse. See Lownds &
Kramer, supra, at 383-84.
155 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958).
156 Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941). See Lowndes & Kramer,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 697-98.
157 In re Estate of Uhl, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957). The Regulations impose
no estate tax here because the power is lodged only in a third person. Treas. Reg.
§§ 20.2036-1(b)(3), .2038-1(a)(3) (1958).
158 Cf. Alice Spaulding Paolozzi, 23 T.C. 182 (1954); Christianna K. Gramm, 17
T.C. 1063 (1951); Rev. Ruls. 54-537, 538, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 316; Lowndes & Kramer,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 706-13; 33 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 116-18, in 1957 Ann. Survey Am. L.
164-66 (1958). 1a Clement v. Smith, 167 F. Supp. 369 (EJ). Pa. 1958), the court found
no taxable gift where the settlor transferred property to a trust giving the trustees power
to pay income for maintenance and support of his father, reserving power over the
remainder for himself. The father (age 62) had an independent annual income for life
of $30,000, with assets worth over $700,000. The court stressed that the father %vas
unlikely to receive any trust income, and that the corpus would be taxed to the sattlor at
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if in fact at the settlor's death the beneficiaries do receive corpus or
accumulated income, there should be an estate tax-but this result is
hard to achieve under the present case law.
The Tax Court 19 continued to hold under the 1939 Code, which
has been changed on this point by the 1954 Code, 10 that where there
is a gift in trust of income to beneficiaries for a stipulated period,
with remainders to them upon termination of the trust, no annual
exclusion is allowed for the present income interests if the trustees
have power to pay corpus to the beneficiaries before the termination
of the trust, because it is impossible to determine if the value of the
income interest exceeds $3,000 in view of the power to invade corpus.
The Tax Court'01 has allowed the exclusion, however, when the
power of invasion is limited by an ascertainable standard and the
facts of the case show that the probability of invasion is remote.
IV
CONCLUSION
As one turns from details to a broader perspective, there seems
real cause for concern about the future of the federal estate and
gift taxes. There is little public interest in or support for them. The
bar has shown little desire to strengthen them-indeed, the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association is on record as favoring
a constitutional amendment to abolish them. 0 2 The Treasury is so
busy defending the income and excise taxeg that it has little time or
energy to spare on behalf of the gift and estate taxes. The courts at
best have never been able fully to free themselves from the intricacies
of highly technical property concepts in deciding gift and estate
tax cases. Congress, since 1942, has scarcely passed a major, or
even minor amendment which has not weakened rather than tightened
death because of his power over the remainder. Cf. Marjorie M. Merritt, 29 T.C. 140
(1957). Here all the shareholders (5 members of one family) who owned all the stock
of a corporation made an agreement reserving to each settler a life interest in his stock,
with remainders to children or other shareholders. They reserved the right to all cash
dividends, whether paid from earnings or capital. The court held there was no taxable
gift of the remainder because all the settlers as sole shareholders could strip the
remainder interests in the stock of all value by distributions of capital as dividends.
The court felt that it was immaterial that all the donors must agree to such capital
distributions, because there were no substantial adverse interests since each shareholder
was a life tenant, a donor, and a donee of the remainders. At the death of any settler,
there apparently would be a taxable transfer under § 2036.
159 Fred 3. LaFortune, 29 T.C. 479 (1957). See Lowndes & Kramer, op. cit. supra
note 23, at 770-72.
10 Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(b) this strange result is reversed and
the exclusion allowed so long as only the income beneficiary may receive corpus,
101 Frances Carroll Brown, 30 T.C. No. 83 (June 30, 1958)'; Hugh McK. Jones,
29 T.C. 200 (1957). See Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 23, at 768-69.
162 38 A.B.A.J. 431-32 (1952).
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the structure of these taxes." In fact, much the same thing is
happening to these taxes as to the income tax: the fantastically high
war-time rates of the tax are still in effect, but they have become
largely ineffective because of the many loopholes in the tax structure,
eroding the tax base. Congress, the bar, and the Treasury no doubt
reflect public opinion correctly when they believe that any tax with a
top rate of 77 per cent is stiff enough. What is perhaps unknown to
most of the public is that (1) the 77 per cent rate applies only
to the top bracket-the taxable estate in excess of $10,000,000; (2)
the rates of progression in the lower brackets advance slowly and
reasonably-only 39 per cent is reached, for example, in the $1,000,000
bracket; and (3) these rates apply only to the taxable estate, and what
with the marital deduction, the exemption, powers of appointment, life
insurance, the weakness of the contemplation of death section, the
opportunity to use a life estate and so omit one generation from the
tax, community property, charitable foundations, the lower rates and
generous deductions, gift splitting provisions, exclusions of the
gift tax, and similar legitimate avenues for tax avoidance and
reduction, the top bracket rates of the estate and gift tax are
mainly window dressing, a fiction constituting only a trap for the
unwary and unsophisticated. As a result, the estate and gift taxes are
in reality imposed not on a man's wealth or on what he actually trans-
mits to his family, but mainly as a penalty for a lack of sophistication
in expert planning to avoid these taxes. A striking illustration of this
fact is the amazing proliferation of courses and institutes on "estate
planning," which in most cases is a polite euphemism for instructions
on how to exploit legitimately the loopholes in the estate and gift taxes.
Perhaps, though, seeds of reform have been planted and may
produce results in the years ahead. When the House Ways and Means
Committee early this year invited a group of experts to present their
views on general tax reform and revision, several of these witnesses
placed great emphasis upon needed changes to strengthen the federal
estate and gift taxes. 164 The members of the committee showed no
hostility to these ideas; but, to tell the truth, neither did they demon-
strate more than a polite interest in them.
163 Thus in the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1606, only one
minor change strengthens these taxes-§ 102 of the Act, relating to United States citizens
who are residents of United States possessions. Whether Int. Rev. Code of 19S4,
§ 2039 (annuities) may have strengthened the estate tax is questionable, in view of
the broad exemption of § 2039(c).
164 Hearings on General Revenue Revision Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). See the testimony of M. Slade Kendrick, id,
pt. II, at 2153-57; Robert Anthoine, id. at 2232-33; William L. Cary, id. at 2269; Harry
J. Rudick, id. at 2344, 2348-49. See also Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Tax
Policy of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 84th Cong., ist Sess. (i955).
See the testimony of Louis Eisenstein, id. at 690-91; C. Lowell Harriss, id. at 692-93;
Discussion, id. at 693-707.
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